Between the mid-1950s and 1970 a revolution took place in the character of everyday life, at least as far-reaching as the social change which occurred between 1910 and the 1920s. In large part the latter had been a response to the trials, suffering and social levelling of what was then called the “Great War”. But in the late ’50s and ’60s, despite the conflict in Vietnam, the changes which occurred were not the direct consequence of war on an equally catastrophic scale. No, on this occasion the social transformation had a more deliberate, planned flavour.
In 1919/20 the hope, both in the United States and in Britain, had been for a “return to normalcy” (to use the phrase reputedly invented by Warren Harding in his campaign to win the presidency). What this meant was a return to the tried and trusted free enterprise system. During World War 2, however, the idea of planning came to the fore as the way to build up the country post-war and it was undoubtedly true that in the Britain of 1945 the pre-eminent emphasis on the capitalist entrepreneur and on the individual as such had lost favour. By contrast, the State, and the planners associated with it, occupied centre-stage, as did the idea of “constructing” a new, fairer social order, where all would be looked after. And given the unemployment and living conditions of the inter-war years, few demurred at the prospect of the State taking more responsibility for matters such as the growth of prosperity, the provision of nationally-organised healthcare, the expansion of education for all, and the overhaul of family housing. The feeling amongst individuals and families of being better off, of having more opportunities in life, together with the increasingly liberal social atmosphere which accompanied it, grew directly out of the relative success of Britain’s post-war planning.
These developments were also in line with the capitalist world’s Cold War combat strategy to deal with the attraction of Communism as an alternative world system. The trend of spreading prosperity and liberalism was shared across the Western world as well as in the colonies, where steps were being initiated to bring greater and greater self-determination. In these areas, many of which had come to be regarded as “trust territories” or “protectorates”, rather than as having simply a colonial status, the relationship between Europeans and the indigenous people was being steadily transformed.
By 1970
1) the aim of securing prosperity, of achieving a “better life for all”, for the peoples of what was now termed the West (as well as of Japan) had been massively successful. Britain’s economy had improved significantly less than the others, due, in part, to a determination and sense of purpose born of defeat in war in countries such as France, Germany and Italy. Nevertheless, by the late 1950s, the facts of Britain’s stuttering post-war recovery did not prevent Harold Macmillan’s electioneering cry of “You’ve never had it so good” from striking a chord with the general populace.
2) Cold War strategy was working, at least in Europe. By 1970 it was abundantly clear that standards of living in the East bore little comparison with those in the West, whatever the hopes had been on the part of Mr. Krushchev of “catching up” and surpassing the United States. Following the move out of the Indian sub-continent in 1947/8, Britain had continued to decolonise throughout the 50s and 60s (in line with the self-determination provision of the 1941 US-UK Atlantic Charter). She was also contributing significantly to the military defence of Western Europe against the Soviet Union. In the United States the Civil Rights movement was growing and thriving. Opposition to the advance in the status of black people in the United States received bad publicity worldwide. When the Federal government was able successfully to outflank Arkansas governor Orval Faubus when he opposed de-segregation measures in his state, this seemed to point to a US population at large that was willing to take seriously the idea and practice of racial equality and the need for the black people of the US to have greater opportunities in society. In a related development, South Africa’s policy of separating the races/cultures and of restricting opportunities for black people in white society was condemned by all Western nations. In terms of overall strategy these policies and beliefs not only represented a more progressive and liberal outlook, but also signalled to people worldwide that the West was offering a way forward which involved openness and democratic elections. A future in which there would be freedom and self-determination was possible within the world free enterprise system. This, it was hoped, would be decisive in the struggle to limit the advance of Communism, particularly in the Afro-Asian and Latin American world.
3) While the West did appear to be winning in those aspects of life which concerned the freedom of the individual in the conduct of his/her everyday life, the leading Western nations in 1970 did nevertheless seem to be on the defensive. Communist strategy had moved its centre of gravity heavily in favour of the materially poorer world and away from Europe. Here the message of Western liberalism could be portrayed as one which favoured the rich, and Europeans in particular, while the indigenous masses remained exploited and oppressed. Even if formally independent local peoples remained subject, it was asserted, to neo-colonialism. In its stead the promise of societal freedom and the plan for the collective building of a new society made for a powerful argument, especially when supplemented by the widespread intimidatory exhortation which was carried out by many of the activists in the “liberation struggle”. In the 1960s, parts of Latin America were affected by these transformative movements, including in Cuba, where a Cold War crisis of worldwide significance was provoked. At the same time Southern Africa, including the longstanding Portuguese colonies, became a new focus for fundamental political change. The major centre of the Communist struggle for revolutionary change, however, was undoubtedly South-East Asia and in particular, Indo-China and Indonesia. In the former, the United States found itself becoming embroiled more and more in a shooting war to stave off the overthrow of nascent capitalist states by dedicated and disciplined Communist revolutionaries, a war which they, arguably, would be unable to win.
4) While Western society was, therefore, materially better off than it had ever been, with freedoms and spending-power beyond the dreams of former generations, at a deeper level a more general demoralisation had set in. The fulfilment of Cold War imperatives, especially where these involved both a process of liberalisation and equalising and, at the same time, the overturning of existing patterns of thought and behaviour, had led to a new weakness and uncertainty at all levels of society. As Britain moved rapidly to its new position as a post-imperial power, her crisis of identity and sense of collective identity were famous abroad. The phrase British Empire, used frequently and normally with a sense of pride during the previous century, was now dropped from polite conversation, and became redundant in a few short years.
Those particularly affected by a growing demoralisation were the middle classes, who had for two centuries led in the construction, both at home and abroad, of the multifold features, political, constitutional and social, of what we now take for granted as the modern world. The working classes, who were experiencing a long-overdue improvement in living standards, seemed at first less affected, but over the long run they were to be the chief losers, not so much materially, but rather in the area of collective self-consciousness and in their sense of satisfaction and well-being. In the decade and a half since 1955 the imperative for British society seemed to be the universalising of an ever-increasing liberal world-view. This brought an undermining of authority at work, at home and in society at large. with the familiar structures of everyday life being set aside to allow for greater informality and the new social free-for-all.
At the heart of this process was the new secularism, which sought to do away with the idea, long-held by many, that Britain was a Christian country. Their aim was to supplant the Christian belief that people were beholden to something greater than themselves, something to which all owed allegiance, something by which people would be judged. Now it was the requirements, aspirations and creativity of the individual who was to be all, free from fear of God, free to construct his or her own life opinions, ethics and universe, beholden to no one, and free from judgment. In place of the Christian notion of sin, the individual was to be free to construct his or her own sets of rights and demands and to complain when these were not fulfilled.
This was the new world of the liberal-left from which few would be able to escape and which few could ignore. Here was the framework for the steady whittling away, and mocking, of the Judaeo-Christian inheritance which had formerly underpinned all elements of social life. These latter were the underlying ideas which had provided the glue for all of the achievements of European peoples, and which had been so important to the wider world as a whole since Europe’s late Middle Ages. Yet now those who considered themselves Conservatives increasingly gave the impression that they were somewhat ashamed of these achievements, ashamed of everything that was traditionally English or British. At best the self-consciousness of the national culture was expressed in ironic terms, as if the dismantling which had taken place through the Cold War had damaged something vital in the sense of collective self.
By the late 1960s the United States seemed to be sinking into a Vietnamese bog. Britain, despite the very exciting “swinging sixties”, with its all-pervasive display of popular musical talent, could nevertheless reasonably be described as a place which “had lost an Empire and not found a role”. Students (rapidly increasing in number and volubility) had picked up on the weakness and loss of confidence of those in authority, both in the universities and in society at large. By the late 1960s, they were in semi-permanent revolt against their elders. This was true not only in the United States and Britain, but in France, Germany, Italy and other Western societies. British workers, organised in ever-growing numbers in Trades Unions, were buoyant, seeing the opportunity for the far-reaching gains in wages and status which had so long been denied them. Such was the loss of confidence suffered by the middle classes that not only were they unable to stem the tide of agitation but they found themselves largely ignored when some of them tried to warn of the dangers of a wholesale undermining of Britain’s traditionally stable network of beliefs. As the 1970s progressed, the consequences not just for general well-being but also for the prospects for employment in an increasingly competitive world market were to become increasingly evident.
What then were the prospects for the Cold War in 1970? On the question of the nuclear threat there was a process of detente. But the worldwide struggle for, as Marx would have put it, the future of mankind, was very much a live issue in many countries. There were undoubtedly signs of demoralisation and self-doubt in the West despite the massive improvement in living standards. Would the Soviet Union and China, who were in the forefront of synchronising the world revolution, be able to take advantage of this? With the humiliation of the United States during the period in which the Vietnamese Communists took complete control (1972-1975), some thought it possible. The incessant practice of self-torture in the West appeared to be doing the work of the Communists for them. Would the collapse of confidence in its historic role mean that the West would now meekly hand the baton to the younger generation of the Left, in the hope that they really would build the classless, egalitarian, better society that they supposedly believed in?
Junius 2 